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Abstract 
 
The EC merger regulations and the Guidelines 
from 2004 both claim that efficiencies shall be 
acknowledged in the assessment of mergers in the 
European Union. So far there has been little 
proof of this, and this thesis attempts to see 
how they can play a more important role in the 
future of EC mergers. In doing so, the thesis 
first defines the three categories of mergers, 
and how they can impede competition. Second, it 
goes through the different types of efficiencies 
 4 
that may arise. Third, and finally, it looks on 
how the assessment of efficiency gains in 
mergers can be done differently 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
First, I would like to give a special thanks to 
my professor in competition law, Jacques 
Steenbergen at the Katholieke Universiteit in 
Leuven. I was in Leuven as a part of the Erasmus 
program for one semester in 2005, and this was a 
fantastic experience on how law could be in the 
real life, and not just in theory.  
When I sent Jacques an email in August about the 
thesis it took approximately 10 minutes before 
he answered, and this has continued during the 
 5 
whole process. For this I am truly grateful.  
Second, I would like to thank my supervisor at 
the university, Olav Kolstad for his pragmatic 
approach. He told me straight away that this was 
a difficult subject, but at the same time gave 
good advise on how to approach it.   
Third, Sverre Hødnebø and the rest of the 
competition department at Arntzen de Besche law 
firm deserve a thank you for their input in the 
beginning of this process.  
Last, I would like to thank my family and all my 
friends for bearing to hear about this for such 
a long time, especially the guys at my lunch 
table. Who will listen to me now? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
According to the new EC merger Regulation (hereafter 
 6 
“ t he Merger Regulation ” )
1
, merger driven 
efficiencies can be considered a positive element in 
the overall assessment of mergers.  Efficiencies may 
“ c ounteract the . . . potential harm to consumers ”  
from a merger and “ as a consequence ”  it is possible 
that the merger “ would not significantly impede 
effective competition ” .
2
 Further, article 2 of the 
Merger Regulation provides that the 
Commission “ s hall take into account . . . the 
development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to consumers’ advantage ” . The 
Guidelines on assessment of horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings
3
  (hereafter the 
Guidelines) similarly indicate that “ efficiencies 
brought about by a merger [may] counteract the 
effects on competition and in particular the 
potential harm to consumers it might otherwise have ”  
and efficiencies therefore are considered in 
determining  “ w hether a merger would significantly 
impede effective competition” .
4
 In particular, the 
European Commission focuses on whether merger 
specific efficiencies would “ e nhance the ability and 
incentive of the merged entity to act pro-
competitively for the benefit of consumers” .
5
 There 
are three conditions for this, and that is that the 
efficiency gain must be verifiable, merger-specific 
                                                 
1
 Regulation N0 139/2004 
2
 Regulation No 139/2004, recital 29 
3
 [2004] O.J. C 31/5 
4
 Guidelines point76 
5
 Guidelines point 77 
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and benefit consumers.
6
  
This was a little revolution. As late as 1996 the 
commission’s position was that “ There is no real 
legal possibility of justifying an efficiency defense 
under the Merger Regulation” .
7
 This was popularly 
referred to as the “ efficiency offence ” .  In several 
cases the commission saw potential efficiencies as an 
aggravating factor because they could reinforce the 
post-merger entity’s dominance.
8
   
But so far no merger has been cleared on the basis on 
efficiency gains. So how far does efficiency gains 
really go in the new Merger Regulation? 
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The main purpose of this master thesis is to evaluate 
the concept of efficiency gains in mergers under the 
Merger Regulation and the Guidelines.  Now that the 
Merger Regulation has been in force for three years 
it’s interesting to see how the concept has 
developed, and also how it can develop in the future 
into an important tool in the assessment of mergers.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Guidelines point 78 
7
 Commission paper at the OECD Roundtable ”Competition Policy and Efficiency 
Claims in Horizontal Agreements”, OECD/GC (96) 65, p. 53 
8
 See, e.g. case IV/M.856, British Telecom/MCI (II) pt. 58, and case IV/M.50 
AT&T/NCR, pts 23 and 28-30 
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1.3 Method 
 
In this master thesis, I am approaching the concept 
of efficiency gains in mergers using traditional 
legal dogma tics as my method. No additional benefits 
will be gained from historical interpretation of the 
intent of the legislator, as characteristic as it is 
to the European Union law and drafting of legislative 
texts within the EU.  
I shall primarily approach efficiency gains from the 
concept itself, but to do this its necessary to apply 
some economical theories. Since I’m a law student and 
not an economic student, I hope that I have been 
accurate and that anyone with an economic background 
who read this will have a little mercy if I simplify 
too much in this regard. 
 As it is hard to predict the future and indeed, 
there is some legal uncertainty when it comes to 
efficiency gains in mergers, this master thesis will 
have as its rationale to take part on the debates 
around the concept and try to offer some views of 
possible future assessments of efficiency claims. 
 
 
1.4 Delimitations   
 
The case law is chosen purely to serve the main 
purpose of this master thesis. It will be used in 
order to demonstrate the development of mergers in 
recent years, and especially efficiency gains. 
This thesis approaches the concept of efficiency 
gains from the legal perspective. It does not 
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therefore concentrate on economic theories despite 
their otherwise high importance in appraisal of 
efficiency gains.  
Efficiency gains are also a part of the substantive 
assessment of mergers. Jurisdictional and procedural 
questions therefore fall outside the scope of this 
thesis. Other issues of the substantive assessment 
like the concept of concentration, the concept of 
Community Dimension, identification of undertakings 
and calculation of turnover are important in the 
understanding of mergers, but will not be discussed 
in this thesis.  
 
 
1.5 Disposition  
 
It didn’t take long before I understood that this was 
a thesis that was difficult in many ways. Everyone I 
spoke with thought it was a very interesting subject, 
but warned that it was a task that would be hard. I 
also went to the Norwegian Bar Association’s 
competition congress, where this topic was one of the 
topics many lawyers had problems with and wanted to 
learn more about. Whit this in mind, I’ve tried to 
keep it fairly simple, because otherwise the subject 
would have been too difficult. 
  Since there is little casework on the subject, a 
lot of the material has to be found in theory. This 
is of course regrettable, but at least there is a lot 
of material to be found. 
 
First in chapter two I will take a look at 
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horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers ans see 
how these can impede competition. 
In chapter three I will see on the three cumulative 
conditions the Guidelines sets out for efficiencies 
to be considered positive in the overall assessment 
of the merger.  
In chapter four I will go through the different types 
of efficiencies mergers may generate, 
And in chapter five I will  analyze a case from 
Norway, and then finally see if there is other 
alternatives to how efficiencies may be assessed in 
future merger cases in chapter six. 
 
2 Merger control 
 
2.1 general  
 
The purpose of merger control is to prevent companies 
gaining a market power witch significantly impede 
effective competition.
9
 This differs from cases of 
abuse under art. 82 of the EC treaty because merger 
control is forward-looking, while art 82 cases are 
backward looking. This mean that merger control is a 
forecast of how the competition in the market will be 
in the future.
10
 
The categories of mergers are horizontal, vertical 
and conglomerate. Here’s a short explanation on how 
the different types of merger may impede competition. 
But first a short definition of the main term merger 
                                                 
9
 Regulation art. 2 (3)  
10
 Faull &Nikpay (2007) p 468 
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itself.  
 
2.2 definition of merger 
 
The term merger shall be used as a synonym for the 
term concentration used in the Merger Regulation. It 
therefore covers various types of transactions such 
as mergers, acquisitions, takeovers and certain types 
of joint ventures. This is in line with how the term 
is being used in the regulation. This is a very broad 
definition, and the reason for this is that it’s not 
the name that is important, but the consequences if 
has on the market. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Horizontal mergers 
 
Horizontal merger is a merger between two or more 
companies who prior to the merger was competitors in 
the same market. 
In horizontal mergers the main issues are  non-
coordinated effects and coordinated effects. 
 
2.31 Non-coordinated effects 
 
Non-coordinated effects is when the merger “ remove 
important constraint on one or more sellers, who 
consequently have increased market power ” , and “ the 
reduction in these competitive constraints could lead 
to significant price increases in the relevant 
 12 
market ” .
11
  
Most cases here are single dominance cases, where one 
company gains a market share where it has the 
possibility, and incentive, to increase their prices. 
The same may be the case in oligopolistic markets. 
This is a complicated assessment, which falls outside 
the scope of this paper. But as an indication the 
Volvo/Scania case
12
 can be mentioned where a market 
share of 30-40% was enough to prove oligopolistic 
dominance that could lead to non-coordinated 
effects.
13
 
 
 
 
2.32 Coordinated effects 
 
Coordinated effects is when the merger increases 
“ … the likelihood that firms are able to coordinate 
their behavior in this way and raise prices, even 
without entering into an agreement or resorting to a 
concerted practice within the meaning of Art. 81 of 
the Treaty. ”
14
 The coordination here can be in 
prices, quantities or quality. This happens when 
there are few players in the market, so the market 
gets transparent. Then the companies can see it as 
mutual interest to align their conduct in a way that 
lessen the consumer welfare.
15
 
 
                                                 
11
 Guidelines point 24 
12
 Case M.1672 Volvo/Scania 
13
 Faull & Nikpay (2007) pp 482-483 
14
 Guidelines point 39 
15
 Faull & Nikpay [2007] p 484 
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2.4 Vertical mergers  
 
 Vertical merger is a merger between companies at 
different stages in the distribution or production 
process. The main issue here is foreclosure, which is 
when the result of a merger increases the barriers to 
enter the market, or make the access to key inputs 
more expensive.
16
  
  
But in general vertical mergers are benign, and often 
maximize consumer welfare by lowering transaction 
costs, eliminate double marginalization, assure 
supply of key inputs, or by technological progress.
17
 
 
2.5 conglomerate mergers 
 
Conglomerate merger is a merger between parties in 
neighboring markets. They are not actual or potential 
competitors (horizontal mergers), or at different 
levels of the supply chain (vertical mergers). The 
main issue here is if the merged group could be able 
to leverage its dominant position in one market over 
in the neighboring market. Bundling two or more 
products is an example of this. 
The Court of First Instance confirmed that the 
Commission has to power to prohibit conglomerate 
mergers in Tetra Laval BV v Commission
18
, but 
emphasized that conglomerate mergers generally are 
                                                 
16
 Faull & Nikpay [2007] p 495 
17
 Lindsay [2006] pp 375-376 
18
 Case T-5/02 Tetra Leval BV v Commission points 148-155 
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neutral or even beneficial for competition. Therefore 
the burden of proof that the merger is anti-
competitive lays on the Commission. This case was 
appealed to the European Court of Justice
19
, and the 
ECJ upheld the decision. This was again an issue in 
the GE/Honneywell v. Commission
20
, and here the Court 
of First Instance confirmed the position taken by the 
ECJ in the Tetra Leval case. And as a result of this, 
the Commission will probably be reluctant to 
challenge this in the future.  
 
 
 
3 Efficiency gains in mergers 
 
 
The Commission has three cumulative conditions for 
efficiencies to be considered positive in the overall 
assessment of the merger. The efficiencies have to 
benefit consumers, be merger specific and be 
verifiable.
21
 These conditions are cumulative, and the 
merging parties have the burden of proof. This is 
because they are the closest to gather this 
information, and it’s in their interest to convince 
the Commission that the efficiencies are likely to 
materialize. If not, the Commission will set the 
efficiencies aside. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Case C-12/03P Commission v Tetra Leval BV 
20
 Case T-210/01 GE v Commission 
21
 Guidelines points 79-88 
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3.1 Benefit consumers 
 
“ T he relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency 
claims is that consumers will not be worse off as a 
result of the merger. ”  
22
   
 
First, it’s important to clarify what the commission 
sees as “ consumer ” . Because it’s not in the strict 
way as it is in other laws protecting individual 
consumers against the stronger and professional 
seller. According to the Guidelines the commission 
see all direct or indirect users of the products 
covered by the agreement as “ c onsumers ” .   This 
definition is very broad, and other undertakings also 
fall in under it. This is because the commission’s 
goal is to protect healthy competition in the market 
in general, and not the individual consumer.  And 
some markets only have professional players, like the 
airplane engine-market. Still if the seller is to big 
he will have the opportunity, and incentive, to raise 
his prices. Therefore it’s necessary to have a broad 
consumer definition.  
The next step then is to see how the merger can 
“ b enefit ”  consumers.  Here the Guidelines use lower 
prices or new or improved products or services as 
examples.
23
 Here it would be interesting if there was 
a case were the prices were likely to rise a little, 
but it was sure that the merged group at the same 
time would produce new or better products. This way 
                                                 
22
  Guidelines point 79. 
23
 Guidelines points 78 
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the commission would have to explain in greater 
detail how they weigh benefits.  
But the commission does not leave us totally in the 
dark. From this it’s possible to see that they have a 
consumer welfare standard.  This is in opposition to 
a total welfare standard. Both standards can be 
positive for consumers. The difference is that the 
total welfare standard seeks to protect by way of 
maximizing welfare for society, whereas the consumer 
welfare standard only look at the direct effect for 
consumers. Economists argue that the total welfare 
standard is the most accurate and that this would be 
most beneficial. But this is a policy that would be 
hard to convince the general public to endorse, so 
the commission is not likely to shift.
24
 
 
3.12 timely 
 
It’s also very important that the efficiencies 
materialize as soon as possible after the merger. 
“ T he later the efficiencies are expected to 
materialize in the future, the less weight the 
Commission can assign them ” .
25
 This is connected to 
the third condition that the efficiencies have to be 
verifiable. Efficiency gains are already a prognosis 
of the future, and the longer into the future it is, 
the credibility sinks.   
This can of course affect the parties’ success of 
claiming efficiencies, but at least there is no 
absolute time frame in which efficiencies have to 
                                                 
24
 Kocmut (2006) p. 20 
25
 Guidelines point 82 
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materialize.
26
   
 
 
 
3.13 pass-on requirement  
 
 “ T he greater the possible negative effects on 
competition, the more the commission has to be sure 
that the claimed efficiencies are substantial, likely 
to be realized, and to pass on to a sufficient degree 
to the consumer. ”
27
 
 
The rational behind this is that when competition 
decline, the incentive the post merger party have to 
pass on the efficiency gains to consumers also 
decline. This also means that a merger never can end 
up as the market becoming a monopoly, or approaching 
a monopoly. How big percentage the merged party can 
have in the market relies on the other players in the 
market, and how accessible the market is for now 
entries. 
The pass-on requirement is a result of the EU using 
consumer welfare as their standard, and many 
economists criticize it for having absolutely no 
basis in economic theory. This is because predictions 
here can only be vague, and that in some situations 
there is no need for efficiencies to pass on to 
consumers for the consumers to benefit from it. 
  
3.2 Merger specific 
                                                 
26
 Kocmut (2006) p 23 
27
 Guidelines point 84 
 18 
  
“ E fficiencies are relevant to the competitive 
assessment when they are a direct consequence of the 
notified merger ant cannot be achieved to a similar 
extent by less anticompetitive alternatives. ”
28
  
If not, it would be theoretically possible for a 
merger to generate efficiencies in another market 
that would be greater than the loss in the market of 
the merger. But these efficiencies will be 
disregarded, and they can probably be reached by a 
less anti-competitive alternative also. The merger 
specific requirement is a reflection of the 
acceptance of an anti competitive presumption, and 
was clarified in the , Aerospatiale-Alenia/de 
Havilland case.
29
 Since mergers increase 
concentration, and concentration is assumed to result 
in price increase, the merger specific requirement 
encourages the merging firms to be efficient using 
means other than merger.  
This could be licensing agreements, co-operative 
joint ventures or a differently structured merger.
30
  
 
 
3.3 verifiable 
 
 “ E fficiencies are easy to claim, but hard to 
prove. ”
31
  
 
Economic theory is still in doubt on how efficiency 
                                                 
28
 Guidelines point 85 
29
 Case IV/M053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland point 69 
30
 Faull & Nikpay (2007) p 510 
31
 Fisher (1983) p 1691 
 19 
gains can be verified. The burden of proof is on the 
merging parties, and the Commission has most belief 
in efficiencies that can be quantified. If it’s not 
quantifiable, the Commission still might still clear 
the merger, but then the efficiencies must “ foresee 
a clearly identifiable positive impact on consumers, 
not a marginal one ” .
32
 This is a very strict 
standard, so an unquantifiable efficiency gain has 
little chance to be cleared. That the burden of proof 
lies on the merging parties is natural, since they 
possess the information needed for making this 
assessment. If the Commission had the burden of 
proof, it is likely that the merging parties would 
attempt to submit the information selectively by 
concealing the data that does not support their case. 
 As a counterpart to this the Guidelines seem to 
strike a fair balance, since, while placing the 
burden of proof with the notifying parties, they do 
not impose a strict standard of proof on the merging 
parties. The Commission doesn’t require the 
efficiencies to be undoubtedly quantified. The 
Commission only have to be “ r easonably certain ”
33
 
that the efficiencies will counteract the potential 
harm in the merger. 
 
 
4 Typology of efficiencies 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Guidelines point 86 
33
 Guidelines point 86 
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There are a few ways to sort efficiencies, but 
I’ll keep it simple and go through the different 
types first, and then look on how to assess them 
after. 
 
4.1 Rationalization 
 
This is when the merged group manage to 
reallocate across plants and reduce its total 
costs, without changing the firms’ joint 
production. This might be done by shifting 
production to the plant with lowest marginal 
costs, or the plant with excess capacity. The 
goal is to reallocate so the marginal costs are 
equal across the plants.
34
Then it’s not possible 
to rationalize it to a more efficient level. If 
one of the plants very modern and efficient, 
while the other is old and inefficient, this 
might lead to the closure of the inefficient 
one, and moving all the production to the 
efficient one.   
The reason why this is possible might be that 
the firm was in a market with high fluctuating 
demand. Before the merger both firms had to use 
inefficient plants at times with high demand, 
but now they can increase output from the most 
efficient plants. Especially if their demand 
peaks didn’t use to correlate totally. Then a 
merger will enable the new company to smooth out 
the demand fluctuation.
35
 
                                                 
34
 Røller, Stenek & Verboven (2001) p 5-6 
35
 Spector (2007) p 21 
 21 
 
 
 
4.2 Economies of scale 
 
No matter how small your business is; there are 
some minimum expenses to keep the business 
operational. This is costs like administrative, 
purchasing and personnel costs. 
These costs are duplicated in the two firms, and 
if they merge they can do the job only once. 
This is reduction in fixed costs, and here it’s 
important to have the guidelines in mind. 
Because they claim that these efficiencies are 
less likely to result in lower prices for 
consumers.
36
This does not mean that these 
efficiencies are disregarded per se, but if the 
merging parties think this will have a positive 
result post merger, they have to be very precise 
on this point, and explain how so. Arguments for 
this can be that a shift in fixed costs may make 
a product that before was unprofitable now may 
be profitable. This will not decrease the price 
of the product, but keep it on the market at the 
same price as before instead of the product been 
taken off the market.
37
Also, if the merged group 
keep most of the profit from cuts in fixed 
costs, it doesn’t mean that consumers can’t 
profit from it. This will give the post-merger 
group room for investments in research and 
                                                 
36
 Guidelines point 80 
37
 Spector (2007) p 22 
 22 
development, which also benefit consumers. Here 
it’s also important to have good arguments in a 
potential merger case, since the commission is 
in general sceptic to the argument.
38
 
But there are many economies of scale arguments 
the Commission are in favour of, for instance 
the economic concept of product-specific 
economics. This means that it cost less to 
produce product number two, than product number 
one. For instance, if you produce a newspaper, 
you can spread out the fixed costs on more 
copies. This is true until it cost more to 
produce one more product than the buyer is 
willing to give for the product.
39
 
Another aspect of economies of scale is that 
when a company increase it’s production, it’s 
incentive to invest in new and better technology 
also increase. This might be anything from 
expensive software, to faster machines or more 
energy efficient machines.  
Next, the post-merger group also might benefit 
from specialization of their workers. This is 
because each worker can concentrate on his task, 
rather than doing a little of everything. It’s 
also possible to specialize the plants. If they 
used to produce different products in the same 
plant, it might now be possible to specialize 
the plant to one type of products. This means 
that the plant is using less time to shift the 
production within the plant.  
                                                 
38
 Spector (2007) p 23 
39
 Lindsay (2006) p 491 
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The exploitation of economies of scale might 
also have some negative effects on the benefits 
to the consumers, and this loss is important to 
remember when measuring the net benefits of 
scale. This may involve a reduction in product 
diversity that in its nature is negative.  
If companies become too large and efficient, the 
Commission sees this as a problem as well. This 
is because it can create barriers to entry for 
new companies, or force other companies out of 
business.  The last argument is debated, because 
it can be seen as a way of protecting 
competitors, and not competition. This was part 
of the challenging of the GE/Honneywell (FN) 
merger by the Commission. 
 
 
 
4.3 Technological progress 
 
Technological progress from mergers can either 
result in new products (innovation), cheaper 
products or higher quality products.  
If one of the merging companies has a very cost-
efficient production level, while the other has 
a patent this plant can produce, the diffusion 
of this know-how’s will result in a lower per 
unit cost. This could also lead to a product 
with higher quality. The take over of many 
Eastern European companies after the fall of the 
iron curtain is a god example here. The Eastern 
European companies had old production methods, 
 24 
and less efficient management. This made them 
vulnerable for takeovers form Western Europe, 
and many Eastern European companies were taken 
over because of this.
 40
 
One of the merging companies may have a good 
R&D- department, but not have the economic 
strength to operate at the highest level. If the 
other merging company have the economic 
strength, it is more likely to succeed in 
innovating a new product.
41
 This has happened 
many times in the medical sphere, because it’s 
so expensive to invent a new drug, and it take a 
long time from the beginning of a project until 
the drug is produced, tested and ready for the 
market. Another reason a merger like this is 
efficient, is that internal funding is cheaper 
than external funding.
42
 The external capital 
market doesn’t like the risk, so they ask for a 
high interest rate, while if the company is 
bought the larger company sees it as an 
investment. A large company also have a better 
chance at securing a loan from a bank, and will 
get a better interest rate at the same loan as a 
small firm will get.
43
 
Last, the companies may learn from each other’s 
experience, and become more efficient because of 
this. This is known as the “ s pill over effect ” , 
or synergies. These are not easy to quantify, 
and they do take a little time to materialize. 
                                                 
40
 Spector (2007) p 22 
41
 Röller, Stennek, Verboven (2001) p 10 
42
 Spector (2007) p 23 
43
 Röller, Stennek & Verboven (2001) p 13 
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This means that the Commission is less likely to 
assign synergies because they are not timely.
44
 
 
  
4.4 Buyer power 
 
A post-merger company will also have a larger 
chance of exercising buyer power. When the 
merged company purchase materials from their 
upstream supplier, they now buy a larger 
quantity, and this can be used to negotiate a 
better price than the two companies could 
negotiate separately. As long as this doesn’t 
restrict downstream competition or lower total 
output, the commission accept that a proportion 
of this is likely to be passed on to consumers.
45
 
 
4.5 Xinefficiency 
Mergers don’t only produce efficiencies, but 
sometimes also internal inefficiencies. This is 
often referred to as xinefficiencies, or slack. 
When a firm groves, it is also harder for the 
management to keep the firm as efficient as it 
possibly can. And gathering all the information 
needed for assessing this s costly.  
But this would make the firm undervalued and 
lowers the firm’s stock price. This may induce 
another company to buy the firm, re-organize and 
bring the firm back to profit maximizing 
behaviour. This threat of a take-over can be 
                                                 
44
 Guidelines point 83 
45
 Guidelines point 61&62 
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sufficient to discipline the current management 
into working as efficient as possible.
46
 
 
 
 
 
5 Assessment of efficiencies in mergers 
 
Now it’s time to see how the efficiencies can be 
assessed in mergers, and what could be done to 
assess them in a better way. First I analyze the 
Norwegian Gilde/Prior-case in 5.2 to 5.7. This 
case is interesting because it might be the 
first European case to clear a merger on the 
grounds of efficiency claims. Then I look at 
other possibilities that can be used to assess 
efficiency claims in mergers in chapter six.  
 
 
5.1 Gilde/Prior-case 
 
Norway is not part of the European Union, but it 
is a part of the European Economic Community. 
And through this the Merger Regulation is a part 
of Norwegian law in the same way as it is for 
countries that are in the EU. 
 
 
 
5.2 The merging companies 
 
                                                 
46
  Röller, Stennek & Verboven (2001) pp 13-14 
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Gilde is a co-operative owned by 28.000 farmers 
in Norway and it operated in the pork and beef 
market. It was the market regulator, and had a 
market share between 43-74 percent in 2004. 
Prior is also a co-operative owned by 1.200 
farmers. It operated in the market for resale of 
eggs, processing and sale of poultry products 
and egg products. It had a market share 
exceeding 60 percent. 
 
5.3 Relevant markets  
 
First, the Competition Authorities assessed if 
the two were competing in the same market, and 
found that these were probably two different 
markets. This was based on analyses by the 
Commission in similar cases. But the Norwegian 
Competition authority didn’t find it necessary 
for the output of the case to decide this, 
because they thought it would be the same 
result, regardless if it was a horizontal 
merger, or a conglomerate merger. 
The Norwegian Competition then saw Gilde as the 
only potential competitor that would be able to 
enter the Norwegian market for poultry. Further, 
they saw this potential loss of a competitor as 
a substantial welfare loss. 
 
 
5.4 Efficiency gains 
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The merging parties had done an incomplete 
economic analysis of the efficiency claims, but 
the Competition Authority found it reasonably 
verified that the efficiency would amount to NOK 
10-15 millions (€ 1.3 – 2 millions).  
 
5.5 Assessment by the Norwegian Competition 
Authority  
 
The efficiency gains were not big enough to 
counteract the harm in the Norwegian Poultry 
market, and on these grounds the merger was 
prohibited.  
 
This prohibition was as expected. The two 
merging parties where the two biggest actors in 
their respective markets, and if they merged it 
would make the barriers to enter higher in both 
markets, and the incentive to invest in research 
and development would also decrease because of 
the loss of potential competition. 
 
5.6 Appeal to the Norwegian Ministry of 
Government, Administration and Reform 
 
But Gilde/Prior appealed the prohibition to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Government, Administration 
and Reform; which is the court of appeal for 
mergers in Norway. And on the 5
t h
 of October 2006 
the ministry cleared the merger. In between the 
merging parties had done a more extensive 
economic analysis, but other than that the 
 29 
premises were the same.  
The Ministry found the two companies to be in 
two different markets, and that Gilde was not 
likely to enter in to the poultry market. They 
also found that the efficiency gains from the 
merger would counteract the potential harms in 
the relevant markets.  
A very interesting point in the assessment of 
the efficiency gains here is that the ministry 
disregarded any negative effects that would 
materialise outside Norway. This way the 
increased barging power the post merger company 
would have could be used to obtain lower 
purchase prices from foreign suppliers. Some 
commentators
47
 argue that this has a 
protectionist flavour, because this is a way to 
strengthen Norwegian agriculture policies 
against larger, and more efficient, foreign 
agriculture. Other see this as a big victory for 
efficiency gains in mergers.  
It will be interesting to see how the Norwegian 
Competition Authority will follow up this path 
pointed out by the ministry in later decisions. 
 
 
6 Other possible ways to assess efficiency gains  
 
6.1 Quantifying the harm of competition 
 
Since efficiencies have to be verifiable, it is 
arguable that the harm of competition has to be 
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verified as well. In this way, there would be 
two numbers to compare, and the assessment would 
be very easy. The side with the biggest number 
would win.  The Commission argues that this 
would be too time consuming, and that it is 
impossible to do this accurately. But at least 
this way it would be more understandable for the 
merging parties to understand why the merger was 
prohibited.  It feels very unfair when you have 
quantified a efficiency gain like Gilde/prior 
had, and just get it prohibited with the 
reasoning that we don’t know the harm to 
competition, but it will probably be higher. 
Then a prohibition on the basis of quantified 
harm would be much more easy to accept.
48
 
 
6.2 Qualitative studies of efficiencies  
 
The other extreme of the burden of proof would 
be to allow qualitative assessments of the 
efficiencies as well.  Efficiencies that can be 
verified should of course still be verified. 
This is normally the static efficiencies, wich 
means that it is conducted for a given point in 
time. Static efficiencies covers allocative 
efficiencies ( equalization of market prices) 
and productive efficiencies (production of 
output at the least cost).  
But with the quantitative condition it is very 
hard to get the Commission to accept dynamic 
efficiencies. Dynamic efficiencies is an 
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analysis who covers several periods, and it 
focuses on the improvement of products and 
production over time.
49
 
 
 
 
6.3 Partial defense 
 
Some efficiencies are more likely to materialize 
than others, and the Guidelines recognizes this 
where it says that “ cost efficiencies that lead 
to a reductions in variable or marginal costs 
are more likely to the assessment of 
efficiencies…”
50
  This is a partial dense, 
putting some efficiencies at an advantage over 
other efficiencies.
51
 Here it would be helpful if 
there could come some clarification on how much 
more emphasis the Commission will put on these 
efficiencies, and how much verification which is 
needed.   
The drawback with this is that merging parties 
would be trying to label their efficiencies in a 
way that would be most favourable to them. 
 
6.4 Clarity 
 
For companies that are considering a merger, the 
most important thing is to have clear rules to 
relate to.  This way they can assess quickly if 
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they would have a chance in getting the merger 
cleared.  This would first save a lot of time, 
which is important, but also save money. In the 
Gilde/Prior-case the cost of lawyers and an 
economic analyst firm added up to € 500.000, and 
that was in reality a simple merger. And 
expertise is cheap in Norway compared to other 
countries. So the costs can easily be many times 
as much. This favours the largest companies who 
can afford to risk going through such a process 
without betting the merger cleared. This can 
also prevent potential beneficial mergers to go 
through, because the barrier is to high. 
A last point in this category is that it’s also 
important for the players in the market to know 
that they compete with the same rules. This way 
they can focus on the most important thing; 
competing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Before making any recommendations for change, 
it’s important to emphasize that very few 
mergers are prohibited. So it would be an 
overstatement to say that there is a big demand 
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for a change.  
And the Guidelines have a very balanced view 
most of the time. When it gives the merging 
parties the burden of proof, they give them the 
benefit of not having to be undoubtedly 
quantified. The biggest problem is actually that 
because of this middle way, it’s very hard to be 
sure how to assess efficiency gains. This was 
probably made like this so the Commission could 
have some discretion to define this through 
decisions. This would give them the chance to 
adjust it as they see how previous decisions 
have worked. It might seem like the Commission 
is waiting for the perfect case to arrive, but 
it is time to see a detailed assessment of 
efficiencies in mergers soon. 
Also, since the Commission has acknowledged that 
efficiencies needs to be a part of the 
assessment of mergers, and therefore it also 
should clarify to what degree this will be done. 
For companies that are considering a merger it’s 
very important to know what analyzes they need 
to do to see if the merger will be cleared. If 
not, a lot of time and money can be wasted 
because of the unclear ground of efficiency 
gains. The Gilde/Prior case might have been a 
nice first step, but other steps also have to be 
made. And since this only was a national case 
it’s important that the Commission make the 
next. 
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